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1. Introduction
During the 1996 East Asia crisis, “[i]n Indonesia, . . . 75
percent of all businesses were put into distress, while
in Thailand close to 50 percent of bank loans became
nonperforming” (Stiglitz 2002, p. 112). All of these
ﬁrms were interconnected, and as a result of the com-
plexity of this network, regulators were facing a phe-
nomenon we call default ambiguity. As then World
Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz describes it,
Every ﬁrm owed money to every other ﬁrm. But . . . you
couldn’t tell whether theywere bankrupt or not, because
that depended onwhether they got paidmoney that was
owed to them by other ﬁrms who might or might not be
in default, depending on whether the ﬁrms that owed
them money went bankrupt. (Stiglitz 2016, at 0:51h)
In otherwords, default ambiguity is a situation where
one cannot tell which banks are in default. Stiglitz
(2016) points out that this led to a paralysis (“it took
years to resolve it”), resulting in large welfare losses
because banks’ resolution could not be carried out
quickly.
It may be intuitive to expect that default ambiguity
can arise when the ﬁnancial authority only has im-
perfect information about banks’ contractual obli-
gations. For instance, Haldane (2009) described a
related effect on asset prices in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
In this paper, we show that, remarkably, default ambi-
guity canalsoarise inaperfect information setting, where
the whole ﬁnancial network is known to the ﬁnancial
authority.
In the perfect information setting, default ambi-
guity can be studied in terms of the clearing problem:
given a network of banks (or other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions) interconnected by ﬁnancial contracts, de-
termine which banks are in default and for the
defaulting banks what percentage of their liabili-
ties they can still pay to their creditors (i.e., we are
looking for the recovery rate of each bank). As in
Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we assume that all pay-
ments are made simultaneously and in accordance
with standard bankruptcy regulations. The banks’
assets may lose part of their value when banks default
(i.e., the banks incur default costs).1
1
An interpretation of the clearing problem is that in
a ﬁnancial crisis, a clearing authority (e.g., a central
bank) observes the whole network of contracts, seeks
to solve the clearing problem, and prescribes to each
bank howmuch it has to pay to every other bank. The
clearing problem is challenging because banks typi-
cally rely on payments they receive from other banks
to meet their obligations, and banks can form an in-
tricate web of contractual relations with each other.
Default ambiguity arises when the clearing problem
has no solution or when there are multiple conﬂicting
solutions (i.e., none of which is simultaneously best
for all banks).
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart
(2013) showed that ﬁnancial networks where banks
can only enter into simple debt contracts (i.e., loans
from one bank to another) have two very desirable
properties from a clearing perspective: First, the
clearing problem always has a solution (we call this
property existence). Second, there is always a solution
that maximizes the equity of each bank simultaneously
(we call this property maximality).2 Thus, although
theremay bemultiple solutions, themaximal solution
is the obvious choice for the clearing authority to
implement (because it is simultaneously best for all
banks).3
In this work, we study ﬁnancial networks that contain
debt contracts as well as credit default swaps (CDSs).
A CDS is a ﬁnancial derivative in which the writer
insures the holder of the contract against the default
of a third party, the reference entity. The holder may or
may not have an exposure to the reference entity.
Prior work has shown that the network structure of
CDSs has a signiﬁcant effect on systemic risk (Dufﬁe
and Zhu 2011, Loon and Zhong 2014). A large part of
the CDS market is made up of CDSs where the ref-
erence entity is itself a ﬁnancial institution.4 An
analysis of CDS transaction data by D’Errico et al.
(2018) has shown that the ﬁnancial institutions (in-
cluding reference entities) in the CDS market are
tightly connected, implying the presence of circular
relationships involving holders, writers, and refer-
ence entities.
Weask, underwhich conditions canﬁnancial systems
still be clearedwhen they contain suchCDSs in addition
to debt? We take existence and maximality as desid-
erata for the design of aﬁnancial system.We thenderive
constraints on the network structure under which the
ﬁnancial system is guaranteed to satisfy these two de-
siderata, independent of banks’ external assets (i.e.,
assets that do not depend on other banks).5 Similar to
prior work on the clearing problem, our approach is
agnostic to how networks have formed. Thus, our
results apply to any network, including those that
could arise in equilibrium from a decentralized pro-
cess of network formation.
In this work, we are the ﬁrst to present an analyt-
ically tractable model for the clearing problem with
CDSs on ﬁnancial institutions (Section 2).6 Our ﬁrst
majorﬁnding is that, in networkswith debt andCDSs,
default ambiguity can occur (Section 3).We ﬁrst show
that if there are default costs, then existence is not
always satisﬁed.7 The intuition for this is that with
CDSs, a bank A can hold a position on another bank B
wherebyA is better off if B is worse off, referred to as a
short position hereafter. In a dense network of debt and
CDS contracts, a bank may easily ﬁnd itself indirectly
holding a short position on itself (i.e., bank A is better
off if bank A is worse off), which intuitively leads to a
contradiction.8 By contrast, in a debt-only network,
banks only hold long positions on each other (if one
bank is worse off, then the other is also worse off) so
that this phenomenon does not exist. If the clearing
authority was facing a situation where no solution
exists in a crisis, a “paralysis” such as in the East Asia
crisis may ensue because it would not be clear how to
proceed. One might wonder which changes to our
model might restore existence in the general case. We
provide a discussion on this at the end of Section 3.1.
Second, we show that even in situations where
existence is satisﬁed, maximalitymay not be satisﬁed.
This resolves an open question by Demange (2016),
who conjectured that if one extended the Eisenberg/
Noe model to CDSs, “multiple and noncomparable
ratios might then clear the market” (p. 967). The in-
tuition for our result is that CDSs can give rise to a
situation in which two banks happen to hold a short
position on each other. In this case, exactly one of the
two banks can be well off while the other one is doing
poorly, but it is not possible tomaximize both equities
at the same time. Again, because networks of debt
obligations contain only long positions, this effect can
only be observed in networks with CDSs, with or
without default costs. In a situation where no maxi-
mal solution exists, the clearing authority would have
to choose among the different solutions, whichwould
imply favoring the equity (and thus shareholders’
proﬁts) of one bank over that of another one. This, in
turn, might lead to major lobbying activities, as banks
would have an incentive to inﬂuence the clearing
authority to select a solution that is favorable to them.
Note that solving the clearing problem is not only
relevant in a ﬁnancial crisis. Regulators such as the
European Central Bank regularly conduct stress tests
to evaluate how likely certain banks are to default given
adverse economic scenarios. As regulators progres-
sively take on a macroprudential (i.e., systemwide)
perspective, stress tests increasingly take network ef-
fects into account.9 In the future, it seems prudent to
also includeCDSs in network-based stress tests, given
the important role they played in the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis.10 Our work shows that the inclusion of CDSs
Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston: Default Ambiguity in CDS Networks
2 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2019 The Author(s)
may lead to an inconclusive outcome of a stress test
due to default ambiguity. Another real-world ap-
plication that illustrates the importance of our ﬁnd-
ings is the recent provision to resolve a failing bank
within one weekend (Single Resolution Board 2016).
If default ambiguity arose in this application, this
would hinder the quick resolution of the bank.
To eliminate these issues regarding default ambi-
guity, we next study what constraints on the network
structure are sufﬁcient to guarantee existence and
maximality. To this end, we ﬁrst introduce the colored
dependency graph, a new analysis framework to cap-
ture the dependencies among banks, in particular
among the three parties (holder, writer, and reference
entity) involved in aCDS (Section 4). By restricting the
cycles in this dependency graph, we then derive
sufﬁcient conditions under which existence and/or
maximality are satisﬁed (Section 5). Furthermore, we
provide an algorithm to compute a solution in this
case. The conditions we derive provide ex ante guar-
antees; that is, they are robust to any possible future
shock on the banks’ external assets. Ex ante guaran-
tees are important for practical applications because
the mere possibility that the market could not be
cleared in the future could undermine trust of market
participants and bring about a liquidity crisis today.
Furthermore, if a bank anticipated a future incentive
to inﬂuence the clearing authority’s choice of a so-
lution, then the bank would have a motivation to
already start lobbying today.
We last discuss potential policy implications. We
show within our model that the policy of routing all
contracts through a central counterparty does not
guarantee existence. By contrast, when “naked”CDSs
(i.e., CDSs that are held without also holding a cor-
respondingdebt contract) are not allowed, thenexistence
and maximality are always fulﬁlled. Our results thus
contribute to the debate on a possible regulation of the
CDS market (Section 6).
Prior work on ﬁnancial networks has primarily
focused on ﬁnancial contagion (i.e., how local shocks to
market participants’ portfolios spread through the
network and cause systemic crises). Researchers have
considered two questions in particular: First, what is
the impact of network topology on contagion com-
pared with other factors such as correlation between
banks’ asset portfolios (Allen and Gale 2000, Elsinger
et al. 2006, Acemoglu et al. 2012, Glasserman and
Young 2015)? And second, how can the likelihood of
an individual bank to trigger contagion be measured
(Hu et al. 2012, Acemoglu et al. 2015, Battiston et al.
2016, Demange 2016)? Bardoscia et al. (2017) have
shown how speciﬁc closed chains in networks of
credit contracts are a sufﬁcient condition for insta-
bility. This prior work has shown that ﬁnancial
contagion can amplify the effect of a small shock
leading to a large loss. By contrast, default ambiguity
describes a situation in which the effect of a shock on a
ﬁnancial network is not even mathematically well
deﬁned. This means that neither the interbank pay-
ments nor the systemwide losses can be determined.
In this sense, the risk of a ﬁnancial system to experi-
ence default ambiguity is more fundamental than the
risk of ﬁnancial contagion. Our dependency analysis
framework constitutes a new tool to study this risk and
inform regulatory policy.
2. Formal Model and Visual Representation
Our model is based on the model by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) and its extension to default costs by
Rogers and Veraart (2013). Both of these prior models
were restricted to debt contracts. We deﬁne an ex-
tension to credit default swaps. Following said prior
work, we assume a static model where a ﬁnancial sys-
tem is given exogenously and all contracts are evalu-
ated simultaneously. We adjust the notation where
necessary.
2.1. The Model
Banks and External Assets. LetN denote a ﬁnite set of
banks. Each bank i ∈ N holds a certain amount of ex-
ternal assets, denoted by ei ≥ 0. Let e  (ei)i∈N denote
the vector of all external assets.
Contracts. There are two types of contracts: debt con-
tracts and CDSs. Every contract gives rise to a con-
ditional or unconditional obligation to pay a certain
amount, called a liability, from its writer to its holder.
Banks that cannot fulﬁll this obligation are said to be
in default. The recovery rate ri of a bank i is the share of
its liabilities it is able to pay. Thus, ri  1 if i is not
in default and ri < 1 if i is in default. Let r  (ri)i∈N
denote the vector of all recovery rates.
A debt contract obliges the writer i to uncondi-
tionally pay a certain amount to the holder j. The
amount is called the notional of the contract and is
denoted by c∅i,j. A credit default swap obliges the writer
i to make a conditional payment to the holder j.
The amount of this payment depends on the recovery
rate of a third bank k, called the reference entity.
Speciﬁcally, the payment amount of the CDS from i to
j with reference entity k and notional cki,j is c
k
i,j · (1 − rk).
The contractual relationships between all banks
are represented by a three-dimensional matrix c 
(cki,j)i∈N, j∈N, k∈N∪{∅}. Zero entries indicate the absence of
the respective contract.
Note that when banks enter contracts, there typi-
cally is an initial payment. For example, debt con-
tracts arise because the holder lends an amount of
money to the writer, and the holder of a CDS pays a
premium to obtain the CDS. In our model, we assume
that any such initial payments have been made at an
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earlier time and are implicitly reﬂected in the external
assets.
We make two sanity assumptions to rule out path-
ological cases. First, we require that no bank enters
into a contract with itself or on itself (i.e., c∅i,i  cji,i 
cji,j  cii,j  0 for all i, j ∈ N). Second, as CDSs are de-
ﬁned as insurance on debt, we require that any bank
that is a reference entity in a CDS must also be the
writer of a debt contract (i.e., if
∑
k,l∈N cik,l > 0, then∑
j∈N c∅i,j > 0 for all i ∈ N).
For any bank i, the creditors of i are those banks that
are holders of contracts for which i is the writer (i.e.,
the banks to which i owes money). Conversely, the
debtors of i are the writers of contracts of which i is the
holder (i.e., the banks that owe money to i). Note that
the two sets can overlap: for example, a bank could
hold a CDS on one reference entity while writing a
CDS on another reference entity, both with the same
counterparty.
Default Costs. We model default costs following
Rogers and Veraart (2013): there are two default cost
parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Defaulting banks are only able
to pay to their creditors a share of α of their external
assets and a share of β of their incoming payments.
Thus, α  β  1 means that there are no default costs,
and α  β  0 means that assets held by defaulting
banks are worthless. The values 1 − α and 1 − β are the
default costs.11
Financial System. A ﬁnancial system is a tuple (N, e, c,
α, β)where N is a set of banks, e is a vector of external
assets, c is a three-dimensional matrix of contracts,
and α and β are default cost parameters.
Liabilities, Payments, and Assets. For two banks i, j
and a vector of recovery rates r, the liability of i to j at r is
the amount of money that i has to pay to j if recovery
rates in the ﬁnancial system are given by r, denoted by
li,j(r). It arises from the aggregate of any debt contract
and all CDSs from i to j:
li,j(r) : c∅i,j +
∑
k∈N
(1 − rk) · cki,j.
The total liabilities of i at r are the aggregate liabilities
that i has toward other banks given the recovery rates
r, denoted by li(r):
li(r) :
∑
j∈N
li,j(r).
The actual payment pi,j(r) from i to j at r can be lower
than li,j(r) if i is in default. By the principle of pro-
portionality (discussed below), a bank that is in default
makes payments for its contracts in proportion to the
respective liability:
pi,j(r) : ri · li,j(r).
The total assets ai(r) of a bank i at r consist of its external
assets ei and the incoming payments:
ai(r) : ei +
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
In case bank i is in default, its assets after default costs
a′i (r) are the assets reduced according to the factors α
and β. This is the amount that will be paid out to
creditors:
a′i (r) :αei + β
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
Clearing Recovery Rate Vector. Following Eisenberg
and Noe (2001), we call a recovery rate vector r clearing
if it is in accordance with the following three prin-
ciples of bankruptcy law:
1. Absolute priority: Bankswith sufﬁcient assets pay
their liabilities in full. Thus, these banks have re-
covery rate 1.
2. Limited liability: Banks with insufﬁcient assets to
pay their liabilities are in default and pay all of their
assets to creditors after default costs have been sub-
tracted. Thus, these banks have recovery rate a′i (r)/
li(r)< 1.
3. Proportionality: In case of default, payments to
creditors are made in proportion to the respective
liability.
The principle of proportionality is automatically
fulﬁlled in our model by the deﬁnition of the pay-
ments pi,j(r). The other two principles lead to the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X 
(N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A recovery rate vector
is a vector of values ri ∈ [0, 1] for each i ∈ N. We denote
by [0, 1]N the space of all possible recovery rate vectors.
Deﬁne the update function
F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N ,
Fi(r) :
1 if ai(r) ≥ li(r)
a′i (r)
li(r) , if ai(r)< li(r).
{
(1)
A recovery rate vector r is called clearing for X if it is a
ﬁxed point of the update function (i.e., if Fi(r)  ri for
all i). We also call a clearing recovery rate vector a
solution to the clearing problem.
Equity. For any bank i, its equity Ei(r) is the positive
difference between assets and liabilities. This is the
proﬁt that the owners of bank i get to keep after
clearing:
Ei(r) : max (0, ai(r) − li(r)).
2.2. Example and Visual Representation
Figure 1 shows a visual representation of an example
ﬁnancial system. There are three banks N  {A, B, C},
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drawn as circles, with external assets of eA  0, eB  2,
and eC  1, drawn as rectangles on top of the banks.
Debt contracts are drawn as blue arrows from the
writer to the holder, and they are annotated with the
notionals c∅B,A  2 and c∅B,C  1. CDSs are drawn as
orange arrows with a dashed line connecting to the
reference entity, and they are also annotated with the
notionals: cBA,C  1. Default cost parameters α  β 
0.5 are given in addition to the picture. A solution for
this example is rA  1, rB  1/3, and rC  1. The lia-
bilities at this recovery rate vector are lB,A(r)  2,
lB,C(r)  1, and lA,C(r)  2/3. Payments are pB,A(r) 
2/3, pB,C(r)  1/3, and pA,C(r)  2/3, and equities are
EA(r)  0, EB(r)  0, and EC(r)  1. This is the only
solution.
2.3. Discussion of Our Formal Model
Note that our addition of CDSs to the Rogers and
Veraart (2013) model substantially changes its mathe-
matical properties. The liabilities li,j(r) now depend on
the recovery rate vector r, and the assets ai(r) contain
terms of the form ckj,i · rj · (1 − rk). Thus, the update
function Fi(r) depends on r in a way that is both
nonlinear and nonmonotonic: an increase in some re-
covery rate rl could lead to a higher or lower value of
Fi(r) for another bank i. Because Fi(r) is nonmonotonic,
we cannot in general ﬁnd a solution to the clearing
problem by simply iterating the function F. The it-
eration sequence may cycle among different recovery
rate vectors without even getting near a solution (see
Appendix A for an example). For the same reason,
Eisenberg and Noe’s (2001) algorithm for computing
clearing payments in debt-only systems cannot be
applied to systems with CDSs.
Prior work has modeled ﬁnancial networks al-
most exclusively as weighted binary graphs where
edges reﬂect binary long relationships such as debt
(Eisenberg andNoe 2001, Cifuentes et al. 2005, Rogers
and Veraart 2013) and cross-ownership (Vitali et al.
2011, Elliott et al. 2014). Barucca et al. (2016) presented
a uniﬁed framework for suchmodels. However, CDSs
give rise to ternary relationships because the holder is
affected by the ﬁnancial health of both the writer and
the reference entity, and they imply both long and
short positions. Weighted-graph models cannot ac-
curately represent these features, whereas our model
captures them well.12
3. Existence and Maximality in General
Financial Systems
In this section, we explore the possible shapes of the set
of solutions for a ﬁnancial system with debt and CDSs.
We construct ﬁnancial systems that have no solution
or multiple conﬂicting solutions. Consequently, neither
existence nor maximality is guaranteed in general.
At the heart of our constructions lies the following
lemma,whichmay be of independent interest to some
readers. The lemma demonstrates a gap in the space
of possible solutions: the recovery rate of any bank is
either 1 or below α or β.
Lemma 1. Let X  (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system, r
clearing for X, and let i ∈ N be a bank. If ri < 1, then the
following hold:
(1) If i has only external assets (i.e.,
∑
j pj,i(r)  0), then
ri ≤ α. If, in addition, α> 0, then ri <α.
(2) If i has only interbank assets (i.e., ei  0), then ri ≤ β.
If, in addition, β> 0, then ri < β.
(3) In any case, ri ≤ max(α, β). If α> 0 or β> 0, then
ri < max(α, β).
Proof. We prove part (3). From the deﬁnition, it fol-
lows that a′i (r) ≤ max(α, β) · ai(r). Because ri < 1, we
must have ai(r)< li(r) (in particular, li(r)> 0) and ri 
Fi(r)  a′i (r)/li(r) ≤ max(α, β) · ai(r)/li(r) ≤ max(α, β). If
α> 0 or β> 0, then the last inequality is strict.
The proofs of parts (1) and (2) are analogous. □
3.1. Existence of a Solution
What is perhaps most surprising about ﬁnancial
networks with CDSs is that as soon as there are any
default costs, the existence of a solution can no longer
be guaranteed.
Theorem 1 (No Solution with Default Costs). For any pair
(α, β) with α< 1 or β< 1 there exists a ﬁnancial system
(N, e, c, α, β) that has no clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. If β< 1, consider the system in Figure 2. Let
δ  3 · 1/(1 − β). Assume, toward a contradiction, that
there is a clearing recovery rate vector r.
• If rA  1, then pC,B(r)  lC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA)  0;
hence aB(r)  0 and pB,A(r)  0. This implies aA(r) 
0< 1  lA(r), and thus rA  0— a contradiction.
• If rA < 1, then rA ≤ β by Lemma 1. Thus, pC,B(r) 
lC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − β)  3. Now, aB(r)  3 ≥ 2 
lB(r), so pB,A(r)  lB,A(r)  2. Hence aA(r) ≥ lA(r), and so
rA  1—a contradiction.
The proof for the case α< β  1 is provided in
Appendix B. It uses a similar construction but where
A has positive external assets. □
Figure 1. (Color online) Example Financial System with
α  β  0.5
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The system in Figure 2 is paradoxical because A is
implicitly holding a CDS (and is thus short) on itself: if
A is in default, it receives a payment because of the
CDSwritten on it, so it is not in default, and vice versa.
Although A actually holding a CDS on itself would be
absurd, having B in betweenmakes the paradoxmuch
less obvious. Supervisory authorities could only notice
that the two scenarios are, in fact, equivalent once they
are aware of network effects and have detailed knowl-
edge about the contract structure, including the ternary
relationships introduced by CDSs.
In addition, although it is hard to imaginewhy a bank
would ever buy a CDS on itself, Figure 2 could have
formed in an entirely sensibleway. For example, B could
have borrowed money from A and later placed a spec-
ulative bet onA’s default before both bankswere hit by
a shock that wiped out their external assets.With only
knowledge of their own assets and liabilities, none of
the banks would have noticed any problem.
Figure 2 is a particularly simple example to show
nonexistence because of its small size and zero external
assets for all relevant banks. Note that these features are
not essential for nonexistence. We present a larger ex-
amplewherenonexistence arises inamuchmore indirect
way in the electronic companion of this paper.
Remark 1. We know from Rogers and Veraart (2013)
that no example such as in Theorem 1 can be con-
structed using only debt contracts. Note that it can also
not be constructed using only CDSs because in a ﬁ-
nancial system consisting of onlyCDSs, the recovery rate
vector (1, . . . , 1) (nobody defaults) is always clearing:
under this recovery rate vector, no liabilities arise, and
thus, indeed, no bank defaults. Therefore, nonexistence
can only arise in systems with debt and CDSs.
It turns out that the nonexistence of a solution
hinges on the presence of default costs.
Theorem 2 (Existence of a SolutionWithout Default Costs).
Any ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α  1, β  1) has a clearing
recovery rate vector.
Proof. Because α  β  1, we can simplify the update
function F from Deﬁnition 1 to Fi(r)  min(1, ai(r)/li(r))
on the set Li : {r | li(r)> 0}. Note that Li is an open set
because li is continuous, and note that Fi is continuous
on Li. We use this fact and apply a ﬁxed-point theorem.
Care must be taken because Fi is not, in general, con-
tinuous on [0, 1]N \ Li. Consider the set-valued function
ρ deﬁned by
ρ : [0, 1]N →P ([0, 1]N), where P (S) denotes the
power set of S;
ρ(r) :×
i∈N ρi(r), where ρi(r) :
Fi(r) if r∈Li,
[0, 1] if r /∈ Li.
{
If there is an r such that r ∈ ρ(r), then r can be made
clearing by setting the recovery rates of banks with
zero liabilities to 1. This is because for all i, if r ∈ Li,
then Fi(r)  ri by choice of r, and if r /∈ Li, then Fi(r)  1,
and no other bank depends on i because of our sanity
assumptions.
It remains to show that an r with r ∈ ρ(r) exists. By
the Kakutani (1941) ﬁxed-point theorem, this is the case
if (1) the domain of ρ is compact and convex, (2) the set
ρ(r) is convex for each r, and (3) the graph of ρ, Gρ :
{(r, s) | s ∈ ρ(r)}, is a closed set. Properties (1) and (2) are
obvious.
To prove (3), it sufﬁces to show that for each i, the
graph of ρi, Gρi : {(r, si) | si ∈ ρi(r)}, is closed. To this
end, let (rk, ski )k∈N be a sequence in [0, 1]N×[0, 1] con-
verging to some point (r, si) such that ski ∈ ρi(rk) for each
k. We need to show that si ∈ ρi(r). If r /∈ Li, then trivially,
si ∈ ρi(r)  [0, 1]. If r ∈ Li, then si ∈ ρi(r)  {Fi(r)} be-
cause Fi is continuous on the open set Li. □
In ﬁnancial systemswithout default costs, money is
never lost, just redistributed. Theorem 2 shows that
these systems always have a solution. It does not ap-
ply once default costs are present because the update
function F then has a discontinuity where the assets of
a bank are equal to its liabilities (i.e., when a bank is
just on the verge of defaulting). This discontinuity
creates a gap in the space of possible recovery rates
(see Lemma 1) and can give rise to nonexistence.
One might wonder what changes to our model
might restore existence in the general case. Ourmodel
differs from Eisenberg and Noe (2001) only in that we
allow for default costs and CDSs. Thus, if one seeks to
represent these two features and aims to guarantee
existence, the only option would be to use a clearing
model different from simultaneous clearing. Perhaps
the ﬁrst alternative that comes to mind is sequential
clearing, where the contracts are not evaluated at the
same time but in some order. The result of this pro-
cedure, however, heavily depends on the order of
evaluation, as the following example shows.
Example 1 (Sequential Clearing). We deﬁne a natural
sequential clearing procedure: The debt contracts are
evaluated in a predetermined order, and banks pay
their liabilities based on their external assets and
Figure 2. (Color online) Financial System with No Solution
for β< 1
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payments received so far (i.e., their “cash” holdings). If
a bank cannot pay a liability, then it enters bankruptcy.
Default costs are subtracted from the bank’s cash
holdings, and the recovery rate is computed based on
the remaining cash. Then all CDSs written on the bank
are triggered and are evaluated next. The process ends
when all debt contracts have been evaluated.
Nowassume that this procedure is applied to Figure 2
for β  0.5, so that δ  6.
• If the debt contract from A to D is evaluated ﬁrst,
then A defaults with rA  0, B receives six in the CDS,
and A receives two from B. The resulting equities are
EA(r)  2 and EB(r)  4.
• If the debt contract from B to A is evaluated ﬁrst,
then B defaults with rB  0, A receives nothing and
defaults with rA  0, and B receives six in the CDS.We
have EA(r)  0 and EB(r)  6.
The order of evaluation in sequential clearing could
be chosen at random or based on some objective crite-
rion, such as the maturity of the contracts. In any case, it
would introduce an element of arbitrariness and an
opportunity for strategic manipulation. Although other
sequential clearingprocedures could bedeﬁned, it seems
unlikely that this problem could be fully avoided.
Alternative clearing models that go beyond se-
quential clearing have been proposed in the literature;
each has its own limitations. Cso´ka and Herings (2018)
studied a decentral clearing procedure where pay-
ments are made incrementally in an arbitrary order.
In a setting with CDSs, the result of this procedure de-
pends on the order inwhich payments aremade, similar
to sequential clearing.13 Banerjee and Feinstein (2018)
deﬁned a dynamic clearing procedure where multiple
rounds of simultaneouspayments are performedwhile a
CDS is triggered with a delay of one round after its
reference entity has defaulted. A solution always exists
and can be chosen in a natural way. However, CDSs in
this model cannot represent a complete insurance on a
debt exposure. This is because, if the writer of a debt
contract fails, the holder still incurs a loss in that round,
irrespective of any CDS they might hold. This loss may
be enough to send the holder into permanent bank-
ruptcy. Acemoglu et al. (2015) studied a simultaneous
clearing model where default costs arise exclusively
from the partial liquidation of illiquid projects. This
assumption would ensure existence even with CDSs
via continuity in a similar way to Theorem 2, but it
also precludes modeling any kind of discontinuous
default costs such as time delays or operational losses.
3.2. Multiplicity of Solutions
We now show that even when the clearing prob-
lem has a solution, there can be multiple ones, and
the structure of the set of solutions may not be eco-
nomically desirable. We discuss this structure in terms
of the banks’ aggregate preferences. Recall that we
denote the equity of a bank i by Ei(r). We assume that,
when there are multiple solutions, banks prefer those
that maximize their equity.
Deﬁnition 2 (Preferred and Maximal Solution). Fix a ﬁ-
nancial system X. A bank i is said to weakly prefer a
solution r over another solution r′ if Ei(r) ≥ Ei(r′). A
solution r is calledmaximal if it is weakly preferred to all
other solutions by all banks.14
Our second desideratum, maximality, requires that
amaximal solution exists. Otherwise, any solution the
clearing authority could select would be opposed by
at least one bank because this bank could achieve
strictly higher equity in a different solution.15 Such a
situation is illustrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (No Maximal Solution). For any α and β, there
exists a ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α, β) that has a clearing
recovery rate vector but no maximal one.
Proof. We use the ﬁnancial system in Figure 3 with δ 
1/(1 − β) if β< 1 and δ> 1 arbitrary if β  1. It is easy to
verify that r0 : (0, 1, 1, 1) and r1 : (1, 0, 1, 1) (where
entries are in alphabetical order) are clearing. In any
potential other solution, we must have rC  rD  1 and
0< rA, rB < 1.
For β< 1, no other solution exists: if r was an-
other one, then because rA < 1, by Lemma 1, we have
rA ≤ β, so aB(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − β)  1. Thus, rB  1—
a contradiction.
For β  1, there is exactly one other solution r2 
(ζ, ζ, 1, 1), where ζ  (δ2 − δ)/(δ2 − 1). This is because r
is a solution with rA, rB < 1 iff rA  δ(1 − rB) and rB 
δ(1 − rA). It is easy to verify that rB  rA  ζ is the
unique solution of this linear equation system.
For any value of β, bank A has a positive equity of
δ − 1 in r1 and equity 0 (because it is in default) in the
other solution(s). Thus, A strictly prefers r1. Analo-
gously, B strictly prefers r0. This implies that none of
the solutions of this system is maximal.16 □
To see why the solution structure in the previous
theorem is economically undesirable, consider the
β< 1 case in the above proof and imagine a clearing
authority faced with the problem of actually clearing
Figure 3. (Color online) Financial System with NoMaximal
Solution
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the market: there are two solutions, one where A
defaults and one where B defaults. Choosing among
the solutions means giving preference to one of the
banks. It is not clear how this decision should be
made, and the clearing authority may even be legally
prohibited from making such a trade-off. If a choice
among nonmaximal solutions were legally allowed,
then a bankmay have a large incentive to lobby for the
implementation of a solution that it prefers most. Note
that, in contrast to nonexistence, nonmaximality can
even occur in systems without default costs.17
If clearing were done sequentially in the scenario
fromTheorem3, oneof the twosolutions, r0 or r1,would
be chosen based on which of the two debt contracts is
evaluated ﬁrst. In practice, such a scenario could lead
to severe incentive problems. In today’s ﬁnancial
practice, whether a CDS is triggered is decided by so-
called determinations committees, which consist of the
most active dealers in addition to nondealer members
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association
2012). In Figure 3, A, B, and C would be members
of the determinations committee. Taking the per-
spective of A, it would be rational to try to convince
the other members that B’s ﬁnancial situation qual-
iﬁes as a default. This triggers the CDS, A receives the
payment and does not default, and B receives noth-
ing. Thus, in hindsight, it appears as though Amade a
correct objective assessment about B. Of course,
B would argue exactly the opposite of A. By contrast,
when a maximal solution exists, it can be implemented
without having to make any choices that could be
manipulated.
Remark 2. Note that Rogers and Veraart (2013) have
previously observed multiple solutions in debt-only
networks stemming from default costs. However, the
form of multiplicity they observed is much less prob-
lematic because in debt-only systems, there always
exists a maximal solution.
4. Dependency Analysis Framework: The
Colored Dependency Graph
In Section 3, we have shown that introducing CDSs
into the well-established clearing model by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) has the effect that existence and max-
imality are no longer guaranteed. In this section, we
develop an analysis framework, which we call the
“colored dependency graph,” to better understand
how and when this effect arises. In Section 5, we then
show how to use the colored dependency graph to de-
rive sufﬁcient conditions under which the two de-
siderata are satisﬁed.
4.1. Covered and Naked CDS Positions
At the level of an individual bank, we need to dis-
tinguish between two fundamentally different uses of
CDSs. For the purposes of illustration, consider a ﬁ-
nancial system with a single CDS where the CDS
writer cannot default. If the holder of the CDS also
holds at least an equal amount of debt written by the
reference entity, then the CDS holder is long on the
reference entity: a worse situation of the reference
entity would, at most, be offset by the CDS payment,
but it could never be beneﬁcial for the holder. This use
of a CDS is called covered. By contrast, if the holder
holds no or not enough debt written by the reference
entity, then it is short on the reference entity: a worse
ﬁnancial situation of the reference entity would beneﬁt
the holder. This use of a CDS is called naked. See the top
row of Figure 4 for a depiction of a prototypical (a)
debt contract, (b) naked CDS, and (c) covered CDS.
For the formal deﬁnition in general ﬁnancial systems,
we must consider the notional of all CDSs that a bank
holds on a reference entity to classify a CDS position
as covered or naked.
Deﬁnition 3 (Covered and Naked CDS Position). Let X 
(N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A bank j has a covered
CDS position toward another bank k if∑
i∈N
cki,j ≤ c∅k,j.
Otherwise, j has a naked CDS position toward k.
4.2. The Colored Dependency Graph
We can now deﬁne the colored dependency graph
(or just the “dependency graph”), in which long and
short positions among banks are represented by green
edges (with ﬁlled arrow tips) and red edges (with
hollow arrow tips), respectively.
Deﬁnition 4 (Colored Dependency Graph). Let X  (N, e,
c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. The colored dependency
Figure 4. (Color online) Prototypical Financial Systems
(Top) and Their Colored Dependency Graphs (Bottom)
Note. Green edges with ﬁlled arrow tips indicate long positions, and
red edges with hollow arrow tips indicate short positions.
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graph CD(X) is the graph with nodes N and edges of
colors red and green constructed as follows:
(1) For each i, j ∈ N, if c∅i,j > 0 or cki,j > 0 for any k ∈ N,
then add a green edge i → j.
(2) For each i, k ∈ N, if cki,j > 0 for any j ∈ N, then add
a green edge k → i.
(3) For each j, k ∈ N, if j has a naked CDS position
toward k, then add a red edge k → j.
The deﬁnition of the colored dependency graph can
be understood in terms of the three primitive contract
patterns illustrated in Figure 4: debt contracts, naked
CDSs, and covered CDSs. In each case, the holder of
any contract is long on the writer because, in case the
writer defaults, the lower the recovery rate of the
writer, the lower the payment that the holder receives.
This is expressed by rule (1) in Deﬁnition 4. In case of a
debt contract, this is the only dependency that is in-
duced, whereas a CDS gives rise to two additional
dependencies. The writer of a CDS is always long on
the reference entity because, the lower the recovery
rate of the reference entity, the higher the liability for
the writer. This is expressed by rule (2) in Deﬁnition 4.
The position of the holder of a CDS toward the reference
entitydependsonwhether it is anakedora coveredCDS:
only the holder of a naked CDS is short on the reference
entity, expressed by rule (3) in Deﬁnition 4. A covered
CDS, on the other hand, only gives rise to a long
position together with the debt contract.
The following proposition shows the usefulness of
the framework in capturing the directional behavior
of the update function F. We will repeatedly use it in
Section 5 when deriving sufﬁcient conditions. The
proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 1 (The Colored Dependency Graph and the
Update Function). For any two banks i and j, we let r−ij
denote a vector of recovery rates of all banks excluding i and j.
Then the following holds:
(1) If there exists an r−ij such that, holding r−ij ﬁxed,
the function Fj is increasing18 in ri, then there is a green
edge from i to j in CD(X).
(2) If there exists an r−ij such that, holding r−ij ﬁxed, the
function Fj is decreasing in ri, then there is a red edge from i
to j in CD(X).
(3) If there is no edge from i to j of any color, then Fj is
independent of ri. The converse is not necessarily the case.
Remark 3 (Parallel Edges). Both a red and a green edge
can be present in the dependency graph in the same
direction between the same two banks. In this case,
whether a long or a short effect is present depends on
the recovery rates of the other banks. The two edges do
not cancel out.
If a ﬁnancial system contains only debt contracts,
then the colored dependency graph only has green
edges; speciﬁcally, it has a green edge i → jwhenever
c∅i,j > 0. Notice that this graph coincides with the “ﬁ-
nancial structure graph” introduced by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001). For systems with debt and CDSs,
our colored dependency graph provides an elegant
conversion from the ternary relations introduced by
CDSs to binary relations, making them amenable to
graph-theoretic analysis.19
Figure 5 depicts the colored dependency graphs of
two ﬁnancial systems that exhibit very different be-
havior: Figure 5, panel (a) corresponds to the example
ﬁnancial system from Figure 1, which has a unique
solution. Figure 5, panel (b) corresponds to the ﬁ-
nancial system from Figure 2, which has no solution.
We immediately see some similarities and differ-
ences: both graphs have a red edge; panel (a) has no
directed cycle, whereas (b) has two of them,A–B–Aand
A–C–B–A; and the former cycle contains a red edge.
All of these features will be of importance in the
analysis in Section 5. Note that, although the cycles in
Figure 5, panel (b) happen to be very short, this is not a
necessary condition for the nonexistence of a solution.
The electronic companion provides a more involved
example with longer cycles.
5. Analysis of Restricted
Network Structures
With our analysis framework in place, we now use it
to describe sufﬁcient conditions under which our
desiderata are fulﬁlled. We show that one can guar-
antee our desiderata by restricting the ways in which
the edges in the dependency graph may form cycles.
We present three domain restrictions where we suc-
cessively allow more cycles and receive successively
fewer guarantees.
5.1. Acyclic Financial Systems
If there are no cycles in the colored dependency graph,
then the clearing problem has a unique solution. As this
solution is trivially maximal, both desiderata are
fulﬁlled.
Theorem 4 (Existence andUniqueness in Acyclic Financial
Systems). Let X be a ﬁnancial system such that CD(X) has
no cycles. Then X has a unique clearing recovery rate vector.
Figure 5. (Color online) The Colored Dependency Graphs
of the Financial Systems from (a) Figure 1 and (b) Figure 2
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that N 
{1 . . . n} and banks are sorted in topological order; that
is, whenever there is an edge i → j in CD(X), we have
i ≤ j. This is possible because CD(X) has no cycles by
assumption. To ﬁnd a solution r, iterate over banks i
in order. In each step, set ri :Fi(r1, . . . ri−1), where
r1, . . . , ri−1 have already been computed. This is well
deﬁned by Proposition 1. In the end, r is clearing by
construction.
Toward uniqueness, if r and r′ are both clearing, it
follows by induction on i that ri  Fi(r1, . . . , ri−1) 
Fi(r′1, . . . , r′i−1)  r′i for all i, where the middle equality is
by induction hypothesis. Note that F1 is a constant
function. □
Theorem 4 shows formally that default ambiguity
in ﬁnancial systems with CDSs is due to cycles in the
dependency graph. Note that we must consider all
dependency edges here, including those originating
at reference entities of CDSs. It is not sufﬁcient to
consider the graph of liabilities, where an edge exists
from the writer of each contract to the holder, cor-
responding to only rule (1) in Deﬁnition 4. This graph
would be acyclic for all our counterexamples in
Section 3, although they clearly did not fulﬁll our de-
siderata. Thus, the more sophisticated colored depen-
dency graph is necessary to capture the behavior of a
ﬁnancial system with CDSs.
5.2. Green Core Systems
The previous theorem required a very strong assump-
tion; in reality, ﬁnancial systems do contain cycles in the
dependency graph, but not all of them pose a prob-
lem. In fact, we know from Rogers and Veraart (2013)
that debt-only ﬁnancial systems, even if they con-
tain cycles, always satisfy existence and maximality.
At the same time, debt-only systems always have a
completely green dependency graph; that is, banks
are only long on each other. In this section, we show
that all ﬁnancial systems with a completely green
dependency graph satisfy existence and maximality,
thus generalizing Rogers and Veraart’s result. We
consider a slightly more general class of ﬁnancial
systems that we call green core systems.
Deﬁnition 5 (Green Core System). A ﬁnancial system X
is called a green core system if in CD(X), banks with
an incoming red edge (i.e., the holders of naked
CDS positions) have no outgoing edges. We call the
set of these banks the leaf set and the other banks the
core.
An example of a green core system is shown in
Figure 6. Banks in the leaf set have no liabilities (oth-
erwise, they would have an outgoing green edge) and
hence always have recovery rate 1. This does not render
the leaf set obsolete: allowing a leaf set keeps the def-
inition of green core systems general enough so that
banks in the core can be writers of naked CDSs. This
feature will also be essential in Section 5.3, where we
consider even more general network structures that
are composed of multiple green core systems that can
be connected by red edges.
Green core systems always have a solution that is
best for all banks in the core. We call such a solution
core maximal. Our proof is constructive.
Theorem 5 (Existence and Core Maximality in Green Core
Systems). In any green core system, the following holds:
(1) There exists a recovery rate vector that maximizes both
the recovery rate and the equity of all banks in the core.
(2) The iteration sequence (rn) deﬁned by r0  (1, . . . , 1)
and rn+1  F(rn) converges to this recovery rate vector.
Proof. The main technical challenge lies in proving the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider a green core system with core C and
leaf set L.
(1) The update function F is monotonic and continuous
from above, where the order relation is a pointwise com-
parison of recovery rate vectors.
(2) If i ∈ C, then the equity Ei is monotonic, also with
respect to a pointwise comparison.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix C. The
lemma formalizes the fact that because all relevant
dependency edges are green, a decrease in any bank’s
recovery rate can only affect the other banks in the
core in a negative way. In addition, this happens in a
continuous fashion.
Frompart (1) of the lemma, it follows via a standard
technique from lattice theory (see Lemma 3 in Ap-
pendix C) that the sequence (rn) converges to a so-
lution that maximizes the recovery rate of each bank.
By part (2) of the lemma, this solution also maximizes
all equities in the core. □
Theorem 5 shows that green core systems always
satisfy existence and core maximality. Furthermore,
the proof of the theorem tells us that green core systems
are structurally very similar to debt-only systems. They
share the following properties, which have previously
been observed for debt-only systems by Rogers and
Veraart (2013). First, the update function is mono-
tonic and continuous from above. Second, the set of
Figure 6. (Color online) Colored Dependency Graph of a
Green Core System with Core C and Leaf Set L
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solutions even forms a complete lattice (which follows
from monotonicity of F via the Knaster–Tarski ﬁxed-
point theorem; see, e.g., Granas and Dugundji 2003).
Third, a core-maximal solution can be found via the
iteration sequence provided in part (2) of Theorem 5.
A subtle difference to the debt-only case is that a core-
maximal solution of a green core system can contain
irrational numbers, whereas the maximal solution of
a debt-only system is always rational.20
A special case of Theorem 5 is a situation in which
naked CDSs are not present.
Corollary 1 (Existence and Maximality Without Naked
CDSs). If no bank in a ﬁnancial system has a naked CDS
position toward another bank, then there exists a maximal
clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. In this case, the colored dependency graph
contains only green edges. The ﬁnancial system is hence
trivially a green core system where the core consists of
all banks. □
Corollary 1 has important implications for regu-
latory policy regarding naked CDSs, which we dis-
cuss in detail in Section 6.
5.3. Systems Without Red-Containing Cycles
Weknow fromTheorem5 andCorollary 1 that default
ambiguity can be attributed to the presence of red
edges in the dependency graph. Green core systems
restrict these edges in an extreme way, only allowing
them to leaf banks. But we know from Theorem 4
(acyclic systems) that red edges to nonleaf banks do
not always pose a problem. In this section, we study in
which situations they do. Our main result is that,
regarding existence, only red edges that are part of a
cycle of dependencies can pose a problem.
Theorem 6 (Existence Without Red-Containing Cycles).
Assume that in the colored dependency graph of a ﬁnancial
system, there is no cycle that contains a red edge. Then a
clearing recovery rate vector exists.
Our proof of the theorem is constructive by using an
algorithm. Unfortunately, simply iterating the func-
tion F such as in the green core case does not work
anymore in the more general no-red-containing-cycle
case (we provide an example inAppendixD). Instead,
our algorithm exploits the structure of the depen-
dency graph. Recall from above that the solutions of a
ﬁnancial system with debt and CDSs may be irrational.
Given this, it is impossible to design an algorithm that
can compute an exact solution in ﬁnite time. Instead, we
devise an approximation algorithm that computes an
arbitrarily accurate approximate solution.We nowﬁrst
describe our approximate solution concept and our
algorithm. We then prove correctness of the algo-
rithm and Theorem 6.
Deﬁnition 6 (Approximately Clearing Recovery Rate
Vector). Let X be a ﬁnancial system, and let ε ≥ 0.
A recovery rate vector r is called ε-approximately clearing
or an ε-solution for X if ||F(r) − r|| ≤ ε, where ||r|| :
maxi |ri| is the maximum norm.
We now describe our core iteration algorithm to
compute an ε-solution in a ﬁnancial system X when
no cycle in CD(X) contains a red edge. Given are ε and
X. We begin by partitioning the dependency graph
into strongly connected components; or cores. Each of
these corresponds to the core of a green core system.
A core is a minimal set of banks such that all banks
with which these banks are in cycles are also part of
the core. By partitioning the graph in this way, the
connections between different cores form an acyclic
graph, so we can sort them in topological order (i.e.,
edges only go from earlier to later cores in the order,
but never in the other direction).21 Figure 7 provides
an example for such a dependency graph. We now it-
erate over cores. By assumption, all edges within a core
are green, so we can use the iteration sequence from
Section 5.2 to compute an ε-solution for each of them.
More in detail, let C1, . . . ,Cm be the cores in topo-
logical order. We store recovery rates in a vector r.
Initially, r is the empty vector. In step k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
we deﬁne a function
Fk : [0, 1]Ck → [0, 1]Ck ,
Fki (s) :Fi(rh s),
where the symbol “h” denotes a concatenation of
vectors. This corresponds to the update function F
restricted to Ck with previously computed recovery
rates of the previous cores C1, . . . ,Ck−1 given by r.
Function Fk is well deﬁned because, by the topological
ordering, each bank i ∈ Ck depends only on the banks
in C1, . . . ,Ck. We iterate the function Fk starting at s 
(1, . . . , 1) until ||Fk(s) − s|| ≤ ε. We then add the re-
covery rates computed in s to r and continue with the
next core. The algorithm stops when all cores have
been visited.
Figure 7. (Color online) Dependency Graph Where No
Cycle Contains a Red Edge
Notes. Cores are marked by black rectangles. The topological ordering
of cores is from left to right; the two cores second from the left can be
visited in any order.
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Proposition 2 (Correctness of the Core Iteration Algorithm).
Assume that in the colored dependency graph of a ﬁnancial
system, no cycle contains a red edge. Then for any ε> 0,
the core iteration algorithm computes an ε-approximately
clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. To see that r is an ε-solution when the algorithm
terminates, let i be a bank, let k be such that i ∈ Ck, and
let s be r restricted to the indices in Ck. By the topo-
logical ordering, Fi(r) depends only on the rj with j ∈⋃
l≤k Cl. Hence, Fi(r)  Fki (s), and therefore |Fi(r) − ri| |Fki (s) − si| ≤ ||Fk(s) − s|| ≤ ε as required, where the last
inequality holds by the algorithm’s stopping criterion.
It remains to show that the algorithm terminates—that
is, that the iteration sequence for Fk reaches the
stopping criterion ||Fk(s) − s|| ≤ ε after ﬁnitely many
steps for each k. First note that Fk is monotonic and
continuous from above. This follows just like in
Lemma 2, where we also need to account for the effects
of earlier cores on the ﬁnancial subsystem Ck: CDSs
written by banks in Ck on banks in earlier cores give
rise to additional ﬁxed liabilities, and incoming pay-
ments from earlier cores to Ck give rise to additional
assets. These manifest as constants that do not affect
the argument in the proof. Now the iteration sequence
converges to a maximal ﬁxed point of Fk like in
Theorem 5. In particular, we reach the stopping cri-
terion after ﬁnitely many steps.22 □
Given the core iteration algorithm, it is now straight-
forward to prove existence in systems without red-
containing cycles.
Proof of Theorem6. We “run” the algorithmwith ε  0
to receive a constructive proof of existence. The stop-
ping criterion ||Fk(s) − s||  0 is not attained after ﬁnitely
may steps but in the limit of the iteration sequence. All
other steps of the proof of Proposition 2 remain the
same. □
Theorem 6 generalizes and uniﬁes the existence
statements of Theorems 4 and 5: individually, neither
cycles nor red edges going to nonleaf nodes are a prob-
lem; only red-containing cycles can cause nonexistence.
Thus, the no-red-containing-cycle condition is themost
general (weakest) condition we have derived for ex-
istence (as it also covers acyclic and green core sys-
tems). Regarding maximality, the weakest condition
we have derived is “acyclic or no naked CDSs”
(Theorem 4 and Corollary 1). The absence of red-
containing cycles does not guarantee maximality
because cores with an incoming red edge may be
made worse off when the recovery rates of earlier
cores are maximized. It is an open question whether a
condition exists that is weaker than acyclic or no
naked CDSs and guarantees maximality. However,
because our analysis has shown that cycles and
red edges in the dependency graph are essential
factors for nonmaximality, it seems unlikely that a
simple condition that fulﬁlls this requirement can
be found.
In this section, we have shown that our dependency
analysis framework can be used to derive sufﬁcient
conditions for existence and maximality. However,
they are not necessary conditions. Although it may be
possible to derive stronger guarantees by taking even
more information about the contract structure into
account, we should not expect to obtain equivalence
conditions: Our computational complexity results in
Schuldenzucker et al. (2019) imply that any condition
that is equivalent to existence or maximality would be
NP-hard to check (informally, this would take ex-
ponential runtime) and would therefore be of limited
use. By contrast, our framework has yielded sufﬁcient
conditions that are simple and easy to check. Thus, we
argue that our colored dependency graph hits a
“sweet spot” by capturing the most important inter-
actions among contracts, enabling us to distinguish
between long and short positions as well as between
covered and naked CDSs.
6. Discussion: Policy Relevance
We evaluate two recent policies regarding their ef-
fectiveness for protecting against default ambiguity
under the assumptions of our model: central coun-
terparty clearing and banning naked CDSs.
The regulatory frameworks EMIR (in Europe) and
Dodd–Frank (in the United States) mandate the use of
a central clearing counterparty (CCP) for a large part of
the over-the-counter derivatives market.23 In its most
extreme form, this means that all contracts are routed
via a central node: a bankAwould notwrite a contract
to a bank B directly, but rather bank A would write a
contract to a highly capitalized central entity S, and S
would write a contract to bank B. One of the desired
effects is that the CCP would absorb a shock on the
banks, prevent it from spreading through the net-
work, and thus preventﬁnancial contagion. Although
using a CCP simpliﬁes the network of liabilities,
surprisingly, it is not effective for protecting against
default ambiguity in our model. Figure 8 provides an
example: there are three banks that hold CDSs and
write debt together with a CCP S.24 Note that S has
very high external assets such that it cannot default.
This system does not have a solution (the proof is
given in Appendix E). Indeed, when we look at the
colored dependency graph (Figure 8, bottom panel),
we see that there is still a red-containing cycle A–
B–C–A. At a higher level, we see that although a CCP
can help reduce counterparty risk (i.e., the risk to a
bank that a debtor cannot pay its liability), the ﬂow of
fundamental risk (i.e., the risk that the reference entity
in a CDS has a higher or lower recovery rate than
expected; see D’Errico et al. 2018) still takes place
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directly between the banks, essentially “around”
the CCP. This is enough to lead to nonexistence of a
solution. Overall, our example shows that requiring
banks to trade all CDSs via a CCP, even if the CCP is
very well capitalized, does not guarantee existence of
a solution to the clearing problem. This result is for-
mally proven in Appendix E.
Another policy that has seen adoption in Europe since
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011 is banning
naked CDSs. A CDS on a European sovereign state can
only be bought if a corresponding (debt) exposure is
present as well (European Commission 2011; also see
European Securities and Markets Authority 2017b).
Corollary 1 shows that if all naked CDSs are banned,
not only those on sovereigns, then the clearing problem
is guaranteed to have a maximal solution. Thus, under
the assumptions of our model, this policy is effective
against default ambiguity. Note that in this paper, we re-
frain from recommending the adoption of any par-
ticular policy. Instead, our ﬁndings illustrate how our
framework can be used to help inform regulatory policy.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that ﬁnancial networks
that contain debt contracts and CDSs are prone to a
phenomenon we call default ambiguity—that is, a
situationwhere it is impossible to decidewhich banks
are in default. Formany years, the total notional of CDSs
written on ﬁnancial institutions has exceeded USD1
trillion worldwide. Although the European Commission
has previously acknowledged that CDSs can give rise to
new kinds of systemic risk, they have not yet considered
the risk of default ambiguity. Our new dependency
analysis framework reveals that default ambiguity
hinges on the presence of cycles in the colored depen-
dency graph. Table 1 summarizes our ﬁndings. As we
have shown, the more we relax the restrictions on the
type of these cycles, the weaker the guarantees we
obtain for our desiderata. To ﬁnd a solution for the re-
stricted network structures we have studied, one can
use the core iteration algorithm we have provided.
Our results illustrate that, to understand the be-
havior of ﬁnancial systemswith CDSs, it is essential to
consider the ternary relations they introduce, in-
cluding the reference entities. If we had instead only
considered the writer–holder relationships, all of our
counterexamples in Section 3 would have looked
like simple acyclic graphs, and we would only have
captured one of the three dependencies arising from a
CDS. Our insights may help bring about a paradigm
Table 1. Summary of Our Results
Contracts Network structure Existence Maximality Reference
Debt only Any network structure 3 3 Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
Rogers and Veraart (2013)
Debt + CDSs External reference entities only 3 3 See “Debt only” abovea
Acyclic dependency graph 3 (unique) 3 This paper (Section 5.1)
No naked CDSs 3 3 This paper (Section 5.2)
Green core systems 3 (3) (in the core) This paper (Section 5.2)
No red-containing cycles 3 7 This paper (Section 5.3)
Red-containing cycles 3 (no default costs)b/7 (with default costs) 7 This paper (Section 3)
aWhen reference entities are external to the ﬁnancial system, then CDS liabilities can be considered constant for the purpose of clearing, and the
results for ﬁnancial systems without CDSs carry over to this case.
bRemember that our proof of this result is nonconstructive. Indeed, we have shown in a separate piece of work (Schuldenzucker et al. 2019)
that, in general ﬁnancial systems without default costs, ﬁnding a solution is PPAD-hard (informally, any algorithm would need exponential
runtime in the worst case). This implies that any practical algorithm would have to use heuristics.
Figure 8. (Color online) Financial System with a CCP and
No Solution and Its Colored Dependency Graph
Notes. Top Panel: Financial system with a CCP S where β< 1 is
arbitrary and δ : 1/(1 − β + β2 − β3). There is no clearing recovery
rate vector. Bottom Panel: The corresponding colored dependency
graph (note that we omit offsetting positions that the CCP S has with
other banks as they do not affect our results).
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shift in the literature on systemic risk in CDS markets
where, so far, either the reference entities were ag-
gregated or the interactions across different reference
entities were not taken into account.
From a conceptual perspective, the reason why
CDSs can give rise to default ambiguity is that the
holder of a naked CDS may proﬁt from ﬁnancial
distress of another market participant. Note that this
phenomenon is not exclusive to CDSs. For example,
the holder of a bond put option and the writer of a
bond call option both beneﬁt if the issuer of the un-
derlying bond is in ﬁnancial distress, and therefore
the price of the bond declines. Stock options exhibit
similar behavior. Thus, we expect that these markets
would also be susceptible to default ambiguity. Our
framework can be extended to these other derivative
markets in a straightforward way (in particular, to
options).
Our dependency analysis framework enables ex ante
guarantees that hold irrespective of a shock to banks’
external assets. If the external assets are known or can
be bounded, future work may be able to derive stronger
sufﬁcient conditions for existence and maximality. To
do this, one could extend the colored dependency
graphwithweights that represent the “strength” of the
dependency. This will be a challenging task, however,
because in contrast to standardweighted-graphmodels,
this “weighted dependency graph” would have to
represent highly nonlinear effects.
An important problem that is closely related to
clearing is network valuation of contracts. Studying this
problem requires a model with uncertainty about the
future value of banks’ external assets. Barucca et al.
(2016) designed such a model for debt-only networks
by extending the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model.
Researchers interested in network valuation with CDSs
could similarly extend our newmodel. Thiswould raise
new questions regarding whether a consistent vector of
CDS valuations exists and what is needed for market
prices to reﬂect these true values.
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Appendix A. Example That Iterating the Update
Function DoesNot Generally Converge
to a Solution
Consider Figure A.1.25 The unique solution of this system is
rA  6/7, rB  3/7, and rC  rD  1. However, the iteration
sequence deﬁned by r0  (1, 1, 1, 1) and rn+1  F(rn) does not
converge to this solution but rather exhibits cycling be-
havior: we have r1  (1, 0, 1, 1), r2  (0, 0, 1, 1), r3  (0, 1, 1, 1),
r4  (1, 1, 1, 1)  r0, etc. One may think that the cycling be-
havior is due to an unfortunate choice of the starting point
r0, but this is not the case: the iteration sequence does not
converge for any starting point other than the solution itself.
To see this, let Δ 
 0 and rB  3/7 + Δ. It is easy to see from
the deﬁnition of F that
FB(F(r))  min(1, max(0, 3(1 − 2rB)))
 min
(
1, max
(
0,
3
7
− 6Δ
))
.
Thus, after two iterations, the distance to the solution has
increased sixfold until the sequence again enters the inﬁnite
loop above.
Appendix B. Omitted Proofs from Section 3
We describe a ﬁnancial system that does not have a so-
lution and where α< β  1, thus completing the proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (α< β  1). Consider Figure B.1, a
variant of Figure 2, with values for eA, γ, and δ chosen as
follows: let eA ∈ (0, 1) arbitrary, set γ  1 − (1 + α)/2 · eA, and
let δ ≥ γ/(1− αeA − γ). It is easy to see that (1) eA < 1, (2)
eA + γ> 1, and (3) αeA + γ< 1.We have γ> 0 by deﬁnition and
δ> 0 by (3), so this is a well-deﬁned ﬁnancial system.
We perform a case distinction such as in the proof for β< 1.
Assume toward a contradiction that r is clearing.
Figure A.1. (Color online) Financial System Where
Iterating F Does Not Converge to a Solution; Let α  β  1
(No Default Costs)
Figure B.1. (Color online) Financial System with No
Solution for α< β  1
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• If rA  1, then pC,B(r)  0, so aB(r)  0 and pB,A(r)  0.
Thus, aA(r)  eA < 1, which implies that rA < 1—a contradiction.
• If rA < 1, then A is in default, so rA  (αeA + pB,A(r))/1 ≤
αeA + γ. Thus, pC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − αeA − γ) ≥ γ, so
B is not in default and pB,A(r)  γ. Now aA(r)  eA +
γ> 1 by (2), so A is not in default, and rA  1—a
contradiction. □
Appendix C. Omitted Proofs from Section 5
We show that in a green core system, the update function is
monotonic and continuous from above and the equities of
core banks are monotonic, which is the main ingredient to
the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. As the main step of the proof, we show
that for all i ∈ C, the assets ai(r) and the assets after default
costs a′i (r) are monotonically increasing in r.
• The assets ai and a′i are monotonic: It sufﬁces to show that
the total incoming payments of bank i,
∑
j pj,i(r), are mono-
tonically increasing in r. To this end, let
qk,i(r) : rkc∅k,i + (1 − rk)
∑
j rjc
k
j,i.
Observe that
∑
j pj,i(r)  ∑k qk,i(r). Each individual sum-
mand qk,i(r) is monotonically increasing in r by the green
core property, which can be seen as follows. Let r ≤ r′
pointwise. Then
qk,i(r′) − qk,i(r)  r′kc∅k,i − rkc∅k,i + (1 − r′k)
∑
j r
′
j c
k
j,i
− (1 − rk)
∑
j rjc
k
j,i
≥ r′kc∅k,i − rkc∅k,i + (1 − r′k)
∑
j rjc
k
j,i
− (1 − rk)
∑
j rjc
k
j,i
 (r′k − rk) ·
(
c∅k,i −
∑
j rjc
k
j,i
)
≥ (r′k − rk) ·
(
c∅k,i −
∑
j c
k
j,i
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds because r′k − rk ≥ 0 by
assumption and c∅k,i −
∑
j ckj,i ≥ 0 because we are in a green
core system, so i must have a covered CDS position toward k.
• The equity Ei is monotonic for i ∈ C: First note that the
liabilities li(r) are monotonically decreasing in r in any ﬁ-
nancial system, as can be seen directly from the deﬁnition. As
ai(r) is monotonically increasing by the above argument,
Ei(r)  max(0, ai(r)) − li(r) is monotonically increasing.
• The function F is monotonic and continuous from above:
Because Fi is constant 1 for i ∈ L, it sufﬁces to show the
statement for each Fi with i ∈ C. To this end, note that Fi is
of form
Fi(r)  f (r) if h(r) ≥ 0,g(r) if h(r)< 0,
{
where f (r) : 1, g(r) : a′i (r)/li(r), and h(r) : ai(r) − li(r) are all
monotonic and continuous. It is easy to see that this implies
that Fi is monotonic and continuous from above. □
The following lemma has become a standard proof tech-
nique in ﬁnancial network theory, for example in Rogers and
Veraart (2013). It can be viewed as a special case of the Kleene
or Tarski–Kantorovitch ﬁxed-point theorems (see Granas and
Dugundji 2003). We restate and prove it here because there is
no standard reference for it.
Lemma 3. Let N be any ﬁnite set, and let F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N be
any function that is monotonic and continuous from above, where
the order relation is given by pointwise ordering. Then F has
a pointwise maximal ﬁxed point, and the iteration sequence (rn)
deﬁned by r0  (1, . . . , 1) and rn+1  F(rn) converges to this
maximal ﬁxed point.
Proof. We proceed in three steps.
(i) The sequence (rn) is descending and convergent: We show
by induction that (rn) is a descending sequence; that is, rn ≥
rn+1 pointwise. For n  0, this is trivial because r0 is the
maximal element of [0, 1]N . For n> 0, and assuming rn−1 ≥ rn,
we have rn  F(rn−1) ≥ F(rn)  rn+1 by monotonicity of F.
Because (rn) is also bounded from below by (0, . . . , 0), it must
be convergent. Call the limit of the sequence r.
(ii) The point r is greater or equal to any ﬁxed point of F: It
sufﬁces to show that any rn is greater or equal to any ﬁxed
point r∗ of F. We proceed by induction: for n  0, the state-
ment is obvious; for n> 0, and assuming rn−1 ≥ r∗, we receive
by monotonicity of F that rn  F(rn−1) ≥ F(r∗)  r∗.
(iii) The point r is a ﬁxed point of F: Because F is continuous
from above and (rn) is descending, we have F(r)  F(limn rn) 
limn F(rn)  limn rn+1  limn rn  r. □
Appendix D. Example That Iterating the Update
Function Is Not Effective in the No-Red-
Containing-Cycle Case
Consider Figure D.1 and let α  β  0.5. The cores of the
dependency graph in topological order are {A,B}, {C},
{D}, and {E}. The unique solution of this system is given by
rA  rB  0 and rC  rD  rE  1. This is because C and E
cannot default, and A and Bmust defaultwith recovery rate 0
as they togetherhavenoassetsbutanoutgoing liability; fromthis
it follows thatD has assets exactly equal to its liabilities.
Figure D.1. (Color online) Financial SystemWhere Iterating
the Update Function Does Not Converge
Notes. Top Panel: Financial system with no red-containing cycle
where iterating F does not converge to a solution (let α  β  0.5).
Bottom Panel: Its colored dependency graph.
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Simply iterating the update function F does not con-
verge in this system. To see this, let r0  1, . . . , 1 and rn+1 
F(rn) for each n. We ﬁrst consider the recovery rates of bank
A and B as the iteration sequence proceeds. Note that B
defaults in step 1, and then, following the default of B, A
defaults in step 2. We thus have from the deﬁnition of F for
rnA and r
n
B (recall that default costs are 0.5):
rnA 
1
2
rn−1B for n ≥ 2 and r0A  r1A  1,
rnB 
1
4
rn−1A for n ≥ 1 and r0B  1.
Solving these recursive equations yields rnA  2−3n/2 for all
n and rnB  2−3n/2+1for n ≥ 1and r0B  1.We observe that for
n ≥ 2, rnA < rnB if n is even and rnA > rnB if n is odd. This is because
log(rnA) − log(rnB)  −3n/2 + 3n/2 − 1  3n/2 − n/2 − 1
and n/2 − n/2 is 0 if n is even and 1 if n is odd.
Now consider bank D. The assets of D consist of a CDS
on A and debt from B, so aD(r)  1 − rA + rB, and lD(r)  1.
Thus, D is in default iff rA > rB. Over the course of the it-
eration, whenever n is even, we have rnA < r
n
B, so D is not in
default and rn+1D  FD(rn)  1. Whenever n is odd, we have
rnA > r
n
B, soD is in default and r
n+1
D  FD(rn)< max(α, β)  0.5.
Hence, rnD changes by at least 0.5 from each iteration to the
next. In particular, the sequence does not converge.
Our example may appear artiﬁcial because bank D is
just on the verge of defaulting in the solution. We, indeed,
expect that the iteration sequence converges if this is
not the case for any bank. However, it is not clear how one
would detect this property if the exact solution is not yet
known.
Appendix E. Nonexistence with a CCP
We formalize and prove the fact that the presence of a
highly capitalized central clearing counterparty (CCP) does
not guarantee existence of a clearing recovery rate vector
(see Section 6).
Proposition 3. There exists a ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α, β) with
a distinguished bank S ∈ N (the CCP) such that the following holds:
(1) The CCP is a counterparty to each contract: For any k ∈
N ∪ {∅} and i, j ∈ N, if cki,j > 0, then S ∈ {i, j}.
(2) The CCP is running a balanced book: For any k ∈ N ∪ {∅},∑
i cki,S  ∑i ckS,i.
(3) The CCP is so highly capitalized that it cannot default:
eS ≥ ∑i c∅S,i +∑i,k ckS,i.
(4) The ﬁnancial system has no clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. Let β< 1. Consider a ﬁnancial system with banks
A, B, C, and S and contracts such as in Figure 8 together with
an additional bank D (for offsetting positions). Choose eD
arbitrarily, and for any k ∈ N ∪ {∅}, let ckD,S  ∑i∈N\{D} ckS,i and
ckS,D  ∑i∈N\{D} cki,S. The system is well deﬁned because 1−
β + β2 − β3  (1 − β) + β2(1 − β)> 0, so δ> 0. It is easy to see
that it fulﬁlls conditions (1)–(3). To see that it also fulﬁlls
condition (4), assume toward a contradiction that r ∈ [0, 1]N is
clearing. As S is highly capitalized, rS  1.
If rA  1, then rB  0; thus rC  1, and thus rA  0, as is
easily seen from the contracts—a contradiction.
If rA < 1, then rA ≤ β by Lemma 1. Then aB(r) ≥ 1 − β, so
rB ≥ β(1 − β). Then aC(r) ≤ 1 − β(1 − β), so rC ≤ β(1 − β(1 − β)).
Thus, aA(r) ≥ δ(1−β(1−β(1−β)))  δ(1−β+β2−β3)  1 lA(r) :
a contradiction. □
Endnotes
1As payments aremade simultaneously and there is no timing, default
and technical insolvency are equivalent conditions in our model. We
use the term “default” throughout this paper.
2Note that the models in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and
Veraart (2013) are based on the payments between banks instead of
recovery rates. It is easy to see that the two points of view are
equivalent. In debt-only ﬁnancial systems, maximizing payments,
recovery rates, and equities are equivalent objectives.
3One could also include the interests of “society” (i.e., the real
economy) in our analysis by introducing it as an additional node in
the network. In Section 5.2 (Corollary 1), we derive sufﬁcient con-
ditions for maximality that guarantee that a solution is simulta-
neously best for all banks and society, assuming that banks’ defaults
can only have a negative effect on society.
4The total notional of these CDSs was USD1 trillion in the second half
of 2017. See Bank for International Settlements (2018, section “Single-
name instruments,” subsection “Financial ﬁrms”).
5An orthogonal question is whether we can efﬁciently compute a
solution to the clearing problem or determine algorithmically
whether a solution exists. We have found in a separate stream of
work (Schuldenzucker et al. 2019) where, in contrast to debt-only
networks, both problems are computationally infeasible in general
ﬁnancial networks with CDSs. It is an open question to which extent
algorithms exist that are guaranteed to be efﬁcient in restricted
cases.
6 See our discussion at the end of Section 2.3 for a comparison with
prior approaches toward modeling these networks.
7Following Rogers and Veraart (2013), we model default costs as
multiplicative discounts α ∈ [0, 1] on the external assets and β ∈ [0, 1]
on the interbank assets that apply only in case of default. If α  β  1,
no default costs are present, andwe showusing a ﬁxed-point theorem
that a solution always exists by continuity. By contrast, we show that
if either α< 1 or β< 1 (or both), default costs introduce a discontinuity,
and existence is not guaranteed anymore.
8A similar kind of contradiction was observed by Sundaresan and
Wang (2015), who considered a setting with a single bank that issues
contingent capital—that is, debt that is converted into equity as soon as
the bank’s stock price falls below a threshold. For certain contract
parameters, this led to nonexistence or multiplicity of an equilibrium
stock price. Their situation bears some resemblance to a bank that has
gone “short on itself” by buying a pathological CDS where it itself is
the reference entity or “long on itself” by selling such a CDS. Sun-
daresan and Wang’s scenario thus concerns the balance sheet of an
individual bank. By contrast, the ambiguity we illustrate is due to the
interactions among different contracts in a network, although each
individual bank may look innocuous.
9The ECB’s recent STAMP\euro framework, which was developed
based on “top-down models used to support EU-wide stress-testing
exercises” (Constaˆncio 2017), includes network effects as one of its
central elements. Speciﬁcally, a variant of the clearing problem very
close to Eisenberg andNoe (2001) is solved 20,000 times in the context
of a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain a probability distribution of
contagion losses (Dees et al. 2017, chapter 12).
10For example, Fender et al. (2008) described how the default of
Lehman Brothers, which was both a major counterparty and refer-
ence entity in CDSs, had signiﬁcant repercussions in money markets.
Further distress in these markets could only be averted by the
government rescue of AIG, another major CDS trader.
11Default costs could result from legal and administrative costs, from
a delay in payments, or from ﬁre sales when defaulting banks need to
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sell off their assets quickly. Details can be found in Rogers and
Veraart (2013).
12 Some prior work has employed graph-based models for CDS
networks when simplifying assumptions reduce a CDS to a binary
relationship. It was implicitly assumed that either the default of a
reference entity is an event exogenous to the network (Dufﬁe and Zhu
2011, Markose et al. 2012, Brunnermeier et al. 2013) or that CDSs do
not carry counterparty risk (Puliga et al. 2014, Leduc et al. 2017).
Heise and Kühn (2012) studied a model of CDS networks with ternary
relationships and short positions. However, they only considered
recovery rates 0 and 1 and a ﬁxed number of update steps. We are the
ﬁrst to study simultaneous clearing in networks where CDSs are
modeled as ternary relationships.
13This is the case, for example, in any variant of Figure 2 where B has
positive external assets. Here, B might ﬁrst receive the full amount in
the CDS and then pay A, or B might pay A ﬁrst, which reduces the
payment in the CDS.
14Note that a maximal solution is not necessarily unique, but all
maximal solutions lead to the same equities Ei(r).
15One could deﬁne a notion of utility for banks equal to their equity.
Then a solution to the clearing problemwould bemaximal if and only
if it Pareto dominates any other solution, and the situation in
Theorem 3 would be one of multiple Pareto optima. Note, however,
that the multiplicity we reveal here is different from a multiplicity of
equilibria that is often observed in strategic games. Recovery rates are
not actions chosen by banks. Rather, they are mathematically implied
by the network of obligations and the rules of bankruptcy. Thus,
instead of banks “choosing an equilibrium,” the clearing authority
chooses a solution to be implemented, which implies a requirement to
treat all market participants fairly (in particular, not to advantage one
bank over another one). This is only possible if maximality is fulﬁlled.
16The solution r2 that exists only in the β  1 case is strictly disfavored
by A and B over all other solutions (but strictly preferred by C andD).
17 If there exists a solution, there also exists one that maximizes total
equity (except in pathological cases). One might be tempted to simply
select such a solution. However, without maximality, there would still
be banks that prefer another solution. For complete markets, we know
from the second welfare theorem that one can impose lump sum
transfers to move from one (less desirable) Pareto-optimal outcome to
any other (more desirable) one. By contrast, without maximality, all
solutions of the clearing problem that are Pareto optimal pose the issue
that the clearing authority would have to favor one bank over another.
18 It follows from the structure of F that in this situation, holding r−ij
ﬁxed, Fj is increasing at some point ri if and only if it is increasing at
all points ri.
19Leduc et al. (2017) presented a mapping from a ﬁnancial system
with CDSs to a weighted graph where they distinguished between
naked and covered CDSs in a similar way as we do. However, they
made simplifying assumptions regarding the regulatory environ-
ment such that only a subset of the possible dependencies need to be
considered. For example, their model does not represent default by
CDS writers or short dependencies so that naked CDSs cannot be
captured. This makes their model unsuitable to study general ﬁ-
nancial systems with naked and covered CDSs.
20 See Schuldenzucker et al. (2019, appendix B) for a ﬁnancial system
with CDSs and a unique and irrational solution. Inspection shows
that it is a green core system. The maximal solution of a debt-only
system is rational because it can be computed exactly in ﬁnite time
using Eisenberg and Noe’s (2001) ﬁctitious default algorithm.
21Both computing strongly connected components and sorting in
topological order can be done easily using well-known algorithms
(see, e.g., Korte and Vygen 2012). Note that the topological order may
not be unique.
22 It is possible to show that the number of steps of the algorithm
is bounded by a function that is polynomial with respect to the size
of the ﬁnancial system and 1/ε. This makes the core iteration al-
gorithm a computationally efﬁcient approximation scheme. See
Schuldenzucker et al. (2019) for details.
23Both frameworks mandate use of a CCP for certain types of de-
rivatives (interest rate swaps and index CDSs) but not for the kind of
CDSs we discuss in this paper (single-name CDSs). See European
Securities and Markets Authority (2017a, c) for EMIR and the doc-
uments linked at U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(2017) for Dodd–Frank.
24For simplicity, we assume that all CDSs and debt contracts are
cleared via the same CCP. This is not necessary for our result. We
further assume that S has offsetting positions with other banks (i.e., it
is running a balanced book). These positions do not affect our result
and are therefore omitted from the ﬁgure.
25Figure A.1 corresponds to Figure 2 for β  0.5; however, in
Figure A.1, we set α  β  1. That is why, in contrast to Figure 2, this
system has a solution.
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